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MEDICAL MASS SCREENING PROGRAMS:
A LEGAL APPRAISAL*
Marc A. Franklint
The lack of understanding between the medical and the legal profes-
sions has been a problem for both groups for many years.1 After consid-
erable effort to create greater understanding of the nature and the prob-
lems of each profession, it now appears that some improvement is
taking place.2 Further frank discussion should do much to hasten this
improvement, but the facts on which such understanding can be based
change as medical research opens new vistas. This article will consider
the recent development of medical mass screening3 in order to acquaint
the legal profession with its medical goals and limitations and to alert
the medical profession to lurking legal considerations before the lawsuits
arise and lead to new misunderstanding.4
* This article derives from a study financed by a grant from the Ophthalmological
Foundation and the New York Association for the Blind (The Lighthouse). The Ophthal-
mological Foundation merged with the National Society for the Prevention of Blindness
on July 1, 1961. I should also like to express my deep appreciation to Ross S. McConnell,
M.D., LL.B., for his valuable assistance with the medical and legal problems raised through-
out, and to Michael I. Ginsberg, third year student at the Columbia University School of
Law, for his general assistance in the preparation of the original study and this article.
t See contributor's section, masthead p. 248, for biographical data.
1 One provocative explanation is offered by Louisell & Williams, Trial of Medical Mal-
practice Cases § 1.03 (1960):
The professional education, training, and habits of thought-not to mention tech-
niques and methods--of lawyers and physicians profoundly differ. The modem law
curriculum is essentially a continuing Socratic dialogue. Medical instruction is largely
didactic and authoritative.. . . The controversial method is the meat of the lawyer
not only because he functions in an adversary system but because he has been nur-
tured in controversy from his first day in law school. The physician on the other
hand has been conditioned to objective scientific inquiry and to him notorious con-
test, with its emotional overtones, is apt to be a disruptive clement in the search for
facts. While the lawyer -typically sees challenge in open disputation, the physician
may see in it only unnecessary insult, especially when his own or a brother physician's
treatment of a patient is called into question.
These authors also suggest that the everyday experience of the two professions reinforces
the difficulty; the attorney is engaged in adversary proceedings, while the physician is the
unquestioned authority at his office, clinic, or hospital and is not conditioned to criticism.
Id. at § 1.04.
2 Among other improvements, the development of codes regulating interprofessional
conduct and the creation of impartial medical panels to evaluate personal injuries and to
testify at trial have helped reduce the antagonism. See generally, Louisell & Williams,
supra note 1, at Ch. I.
3 The concept of mass screening is discussed in detail and defined in the text following
note 10 infra.
4 As yet, there are no reported cases in the United States involving claims arising out
of mass screening programs conducted for the public. The relatively few cases that do
exist on the subject of screening have their origins in examinations given only to limited
groups. This distinction may be significant. In one case, a hospital in its capacity
as prospective employer gave the plaintiff a physical examination including a chest
x-ray. The hospital failed to discover an existing tubercular condition and plaintiff's
work assignment aggravated his condition. In discussing the relationship between the
parties the court said:
Concededly, the hospital examines its employees primarily for its own benefit. This
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The traditional physician-patient relationship characterized by per-
sonal and extensive consideration of the individual patient's condition5
gives rise to legal disputes well-known and understood by both pro-
fessions. These disputes are usually complicated by disagreement about
the specific facts of a case and proof problems, several of which are
unique to malpractice cases and which make it more difficult for the
plaintiff to prove liability than in ordinary negligence actions.6 These
protections for the physician asideJ the personal physician-patient
relationship may lead to liability for lack of due care in either the
diagnosis or treatment aspects of the case, or both.' New diagnosis or
is something the person examined knows, and, hence, although there may be some
reliance, it is in some lesser degree than in the case of a regular patient. Thus,
whether, as a result of such examination, there is a duty to discover, as well as
to disclose, any medical condition requiring treatment may be difficult to resolve.
A similar question would arise in connection with entrance or other physical exami-
nations given by many nonhospital employers, educational institutions, governmental
organizations and others, where it is primarily the purpose of the examiner that is to
be served, rather than that of the person examined.
Battistella v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 9 App. Div. 2d 75, 77-78, 191 N.Y.S.2d 626,
629 (1st Dep't 1959). The court then recognized that public mass screenings are for
the benefit of the persons examined.
Another difference is that in the employer and other limited screening cases the person
usually receives an extensive, albeit cursory, physical examination, whereas, as will be seen,
public mass screenings generally stress a single procedure, though sometimes multiple
screening procedures are offered to the public at the same time. This one procedure is
chosen because it is apt for screening procedures, and not only because it is useful in
telling about the physical condition of an individual. For these reasons, the limited screening
programs present at best incomplete analogies to the problems discussed in this article.
5 The traditional relationship is discussed in detail in Louisell & Williams, supra note 1,
at Ch. II.
I The usual requirement that the plaintiff introduce expert testimony to show the
prevailing standard of medical practice in the community and that the defendant failed
to meet that standard differs in two ways from the required proof in a non-malpractice
negligence case. First, the prevailing medical custom is accepted as the standard to
which the defendant must adhere. In ordinary cases, the prevailing custom of persons
in positions similar to that of the defendant may be admissible but is not controlling
since it may, itself, be negligent. See Morris, "Custom and Negligence," 42 Colum. L.
Rev. 1147, 1163 (1942). The second difference is that in all but the most egregious cases
of malpractice a lay jury is deemed incompetent to decide whether the physician acted
properly without expert testimony to that effect. 2 Harper & James, Torts § 17.1, at 968
(1956). Moreover, even with expert testimony in support of his position, plaintiff may not
be permitted to have the jury decide the question of malpractice if the defendant shows that
plaintiff's expert follows a medical view with which the defendant does not agree, and
that defendant's position is accepted by respectable, though minority, medical authority.
See, e.g., Gielskie v. State, 10 App. Div. 2d 471, 200 N.Y.S.2d 691 (3d Dep't 1960),
aff'd without opinion, 9 N.Y.2d 834, 175 N.E.2d 455, 216 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1961) and
DiFilippo v. Preston, - Del. -, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
7 It is not suggested that these additional protections are in any way inappropriate to
the case of malpractice. One malpractice judgment against a physician may destroy his
livelihood and his reputation, while a judgment against a negligent driver does not
generally affect his social or economic status, though the plaintiff suffers the same
injuries in both cases. See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 17.1, at 969 (1956).
8 Some courts have stated that negligence in the diagnostic phase of a relationship can
never, without more, be the basis for liability, and that this negligence must be followed
by improper treatment causing the injury. See, e.g., Poor Sisters of St. Francis v. Long,
190 Tenn. 434, 230 S.W.2d 659 (1950); Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P.2d
766 (1956). But the cases do not appear to support the stated proposition. These
cases may be explained on one of several bases: the plaintiff showed only improper but
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treatment procedures affect only the specific fact question of whether in
a given case the physician met his obligation.
In recent years, the medical profession has sought to develop means of
dealing with disease at earlier stages. The entire field of preventive
medicine is premised on the desirability and feasibility of preventing
the onset of certain diseases.9 Also included are efforts to detect disease
in individuals before it has progressed to the point at which the victim
is aware of its existence, although this is not strictly prevention but
rather control of incipient disease.' 0 Mass screening, one phase of this
area, is the procedure with which this article is primarily concerned.
Screening has been defined as
the presumptive identification of unrecognized disease or. defect by the
application of tests, examination, or other procedures which can be applied
rapidly. Screening tests sort out apparently well persons who probably
have a disease from those who probably do not. A screening test is not
intended to be diagnostic. Persons with positive or suspicious findings
must be referred to their physicians for diagnosis and necessary treatment."
The essence of screening is its reliance on a single medical procedure to
which every screenee is exposed. The specific procedure is selected for
its medical effectiveness as a method of detection and the feasibility of
its rapid application to numerous persons. There can be only minimal
personalization of the routine; screening can be effective only if it relies
on predetermined standards of presumptive normalcy that will be
accurate for the vast majority of the population. Thus, screening is
quite different from the traditional concept of diagnosis. Diagnosis is
personalized; the question is what ails the particular patient, and he may
undergo several different procedures to find the answer. In screening,
on the other hand, one procedure is applied rapidly to many persons.
Those whose screening results indicate possible disease are advised to
follow the screening with diagnosis and, if necessary, treatment.
not negligent diagnosis (Huttner, supra) or even a correct diagnosis would not have
helped the plaintiff because the condition could not have been treated (Long, supra).
In still other cases, the negligence of the diagnosing physician may not have been deemed
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, because the negligence of the treating
physician was deemed superceding in the particular facts. Cf. Bugg v. Security Ben.
Ass'n, 153 Kan. 522, 112 P.2d 73 (1941). These cases are all consistent with the general
principle that if a negligent diagnosis is shown to have caused injury to a plaintiff, the
defendant will be liable. See, e.g., Smith v. Malilnckrodt Chem. Works, 212 Mo. App.
158, 251 S.W. 155 (1923) (plaintiff hurt by delay based on negligent diagnosis that he was
well); Greenwood v. Harris, 362 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1961) (needless operation resulted in
scars).
9 See Levin, "Screening for Asymptomatic Disease, Principles and Background," 2 J.
Chronic Diseases 367 (1955).
10 Broadly conceived, preventive medicine has two branches: prevention of occurrence
of disease and prevention of progression of disease. Hilleboe & Larimore, Preventive
Medicine 1 (1959).
11 Breslow & Roberts, "Introductory Statement on Screening for Asymptomatic Disease,"
2 J. Chronic Diseases 363, 365 (1955). (Emphasis in original.)
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Mass screening will certainly not be feasible for every disease. For
screening to be successful, the disease must have at least one distinc-
tive sign or symptom detectable very early by a rapid and inexpensive
procedure. Mass screening is most valuable when it seeks a disease that
may be easily cured or controlled if discovered early, but is severe,
incurable, or uncontrollable, if allowed to progress to the stage at which
the victim himself is aware of its presence.
Perhaps the most familiar of these public screening programs is the
chest x-ray,12 but they have also been used increasingly in efforts to
detect glaucoma, 3 diabetes,'14 cancer,'5 and other diseases. 6 To clarify
much of the following discussion of the legal problems of screening, it
will be helpful to explore in some depth a specific disease and its
screening program that may serve as a continuous illustration throughout
this paper. Glaucoma has been chosen because it presents a readily
understandable, though rather complex, example of the medical and
legal problems involved. 7
Glaucoma is characterized by an abnormal elevation of the pressure
within the eye."' Unless this elevation is controlled, a. progressive
deterioration of tissues essential to vision will occur and will produce
irreversible and total blindness. Although there are several types of
glaucoma, consideration of the two most common varieties will suffice
here. The acute variety of primary glaucoma (also known as closed
angle glaucoma) is epitomized by sudden, very painful increases in
pressure in the anterior chamber of the eye. The victim is immediately
aware that something is wrong and will probably see a physician who
will be able to detect and usually control the condition by simple treat-
ment. Thus, acute glaucoma really presents no preventive medicine
problem because the 'victim is aware of the condition early enough
to avert serious damage.1
9
12 Although chest x-rays are traditionally associated with tuberculosis screening, they
also prove valuable in detecting other chest defects including lung cancer. See Anderson,
"The Future of the Miniature Chest X-ray in Screening for Asymptomatic Disease,"
2 J. Chronic Diseases 418, 422-25 (1955).
1 Foote & Boyce, "Screening for Glaucoma," 2 J. Chronic Diseases 487 (1955);
Ryan, "Glaucoma-A New Challenge to Occupational Medicine," I Archives of Environ-
mental Health 278 (1960).
14 Reynolds, "Screening Methods for Diabetes Mellitus," in Hilleboe & Larimore,
Preventive Medicine 541 (1959); Wilkerson, "Screening for Diabetes," 2 J. Chronic
Diseases 464 (1955).
15 Levin, "Cancer Detection and Screening," in Rilleboe & Larimore, Preventive Medicine
505 (1959)'; Dunn, "Screening for Cancer," 2 J. Chronic Diseases 450 (1955).
16 For the several other conditions for which screening is conducted, see the entire
Symposium on Screening for Asymptomatic Disease, 2 J. Chronic Diseases 363-490 (1955).
17 It is also the medical problem with which I am most familiar. See introductory note,
supra.
18 See generally for a discussion of the medical aspects of glaucoma, Sugar, The
Glaucomas, passim (2d ed. 1957).
19 Also, acute glaucoma is quantitatively less significant that the chronic variety.
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The chronic simple variety of primary glaucoma (also known as
wide or normal angle glaucoma), however, is characterized by a very
gradual increase in the intraocular pressure that may take ten years or
more from onset to the first impairment of vision.2" No sudden pain
episodes occur and the victim is unlikely to be aware that he has chronic
glaucoma until his vision starts to wane, by which time it may be too
late to save much, if any, of it. The disease can generally be held in
check when discovered, but since the damage already done is irreparable,
early detection is vital. Most important, a rapid, inexpensive medical
procedure exists that will detect most of the incipient cases of chronic
simple glaucoma and is ideal for mass screening.2'
The procedure relies upon the fact that elevated pressure characterizes
most chronic glaucoma.22 Several instruments, called tonometers, have
been developed to measure this pressure by a procedure called tono-
metry.23 The traditional tonometer operates on a gravity principle. The
person being tested lies on a cot or bed. After a few drops of anesthetic
have taken effect,24 the patient is told to look straight up. The tono-
meter is placed very gently on each eye for an instant and a weight is
allowed to rest free on the surface of the cornea. The resistance to the
descent of the weight is measured on a scale yielding an approximation
of the internal pressure of that eye.
Several factors, however, combine to make accurate measurement
difficult. First, there are mechanical problems. The instrument is
very delicate and must be held perfectly vertical; it must not be pressed
on the eye but allowed to rest freely on the surface. There are also
biological problems. If the screenee is nervous and squeezes his eyelids
or eye muscles, the measurement will be unduly high. Also, the very
act of measuring pressure will cause its own changes in the pressure.
The normal person's reaction to the weight of the instrument has been
estimated and on that basis professional groups have erected conversion
Acute glaucoma is estimated to constitute only 10 or 15% of the total of the two varieties.
See Ryan, "Glaucoma-A New Challenge to Occupational Medicine," 1 Archives of En-
vironmental Health 278 (1960), Glaucoma Program Guide 5 (N.Y. State Dep't of Health,
Chronic Diseases & Geriatrics Monograph No. 3, 1959).
20 The ten-year estimate appears in Leydhecker, "The Technique and Organization of
Mass Screening for Glaucoma," 51 Am. J. Ophthalmology 248, 249 (1961).
21 Because of the much greater incidence of chronic glaucoma among people over 40
than those under 40, most screening programs strive to attract the former population group.
22 This is not true of a variety of chronic glaucoma known as low-tension glaucoma.
See text accompanying note 26 infra.
23 Tonometry is discussed in detail in Sugar, The Glaucomas Ch. VI (2d ed. 1957).
24 The currently-used anesthetics take effect within 30 seconds and last for 15 to 20
minutes. This leads to a problem that is discussed in the text following note 55 infra.
All persons receiving eye anesthetics are warned not to rub their eyes for a certain period.
lest some tissue be rubbed off without the person realizing it.
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tables that give meaningful equivalents to the scale readings on the
instrument. However, some persons do not react normally to the
measuring process. Their reflex action may alter the secretion of fluids
in an unusual way or their muscles may become unusually distended or
elastic. These persons are said to have atypical scleral rigidity, which
will cause inaccurate conversions of their scale readings.
Another impediment to accurate measurement is that one's pressure
varies in the course of the day-whether he is normal or has glaucoma.
Apparently these cycles, called diurnal fluctuations, are such that a
reading in the afternoon or evening may be lower than one taken in the
morning. This daily variation is greatest in those who have glaucoma. 25
Also, it appears that a large amount of liquid in the body or nervousness
of the screenee will raise the measurement to some undetermined extent.
However, even if these difficulties did not exist, some fifteen to twenty
per cent of the chronic simple glaucoma cases would still not be detected
by tonometry because the increased pressures, though abnormal in the
victims' body systems, do not reach the danger figure set for the public
at large. 6
Glaucoma provides a concrete example of the difference between
diagnosis and screening. The screening procedure calls only for tono-
metry. When that test yields positive or suspicious findings, the
screenee is referred to a physician for diagnosis. The physician may
do several tonometries with different instruments and weights27 and at
different times of the day; he may test the patient's visual field to see
if there has been any impairment; he may perform several provocative
tests-procedures that will induce certain reactions in glaucoma victims
but other reactions in people who have not got the disease.2" In other
words, the follow-up would conform to the accepted ophthalmological
procedure for glaucoma diagnosis.29
Thus informed about the nature of glaucoma and its screening pro-
gram, we may consider some of the major legal problems inherent in
25 Four different types of diurnal fluctuation have been reported; until recently, it had
been thought that the peak was reached only once a day in the morning and that the
afternoon and evening yielded lower tensions. The presence of four types, some with
double peaks, suggests that the error from this source may be less than originally feared.
See Sugar, supra note 23, at 177-78.
26 See Sugar, supra note 23, at 53.
27 The weight used may be one of three sizes: 5.5 gin, 7.5 gin, or 10 gin. The first
two are most commonly used. Atypically high scleral rigidity will have less adverse effect
on a measurement done with a heavy (10 gin) weight, but the 10 gm weight is a less
accurate one for testing the vast majority with normal scleral rigidity.
28 For a full discussion of diagnostic procedures for glaucoma including discussion of the
provocative tests, see Sugar, supra note 23, at Ch. XIII.
29 Of course, not every procedure need be done in every diagnosis. The follow-up need
be only as complete as original diagnosis would require to confirm or negate the presence
of the suspected disease.
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mass screening. These fall naturally into three categories: choice of the
screening procedure, execution of that procedure, and problems arising
from test result notification.
CHOICE OF SCREENING PROCEDURE
The first category involves the problem of choosing a legally permis-
sible screening procedure. ° Since no presently conducted screening
program appears so hazardous or contrary to public policy as to be
subject to strict liability or to being enjoined, the question is whether
the specific procedure proposed is unreasonably dangerous so as to make
its use negligent."- The answer to this question requires consideration
of three factors: the likelihood of harm caused by the specific activity;
the severity of injury if it should occur; and the interests that would
be sacrificed if the specific act were not undertaken. The first two of these
factors must then be set against the third, balancing the dangers of the
specific activity against its benefits to see which outweighs the other.2
30 This article proceeds upon the assumption that the group doing the screening is
not protected from tort liability by any immunity-either governmental, charitable, or
based on a valid exculpatory agreement. For a recent state-by-state compilation of the
status of governmental and charitable immunity, see Louisell & Williams, Trial of
Medical Malpractice Cases, Ch. XVII (1960).
It should also be noted that, in the absence of such immunity, it is no defense that
the screening program was being conducted without charge to the public. See Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956), in which the jury
found that the defendant had given chest x-rays as part of its periodic medical exami-
nation of its employees, had found tuberculosis in the plaintiff at numerous times, had
noted it on his card, but had failed to inform him of it. The fact that the service was
free and did not have to be given at all did not exonerate the defendant from liability
so long as the plaintiff could reasonably expect to be told of a discovered defect.
It should also be noted that, although this article is primarily concerned with liability
only to screenees for the negligence of the screening group, this may not be the actual
limit of liability. In Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d. 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d
351 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1959), the tubercular wife of an employee was held to have
an action against her husband's employer under allegations that the defendant negligently
failed to inform her husband that his chest x-ray might indicate a tubercular condition.
The court considered it reasonably foreseeable that an employee who was not aware of
a contagious condition would spread it to his wife.
31 As to the situations in which strict liability or injunctions may be invoked against
activities, see 2 Harper & James, Torts 932-36 (1956). As the following paragraphs in
the text demonstrate, tonometry is a most safe procedure.
If all of the risks of a specific procedure are fully and openly announced to potential
participants in advance, there would be no liability to these persons for injuries caused
by inherent dangers in the procedure. The explanation might be framed in terms of the
plaintiff having "assumed the risk." Cf. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250
N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929). Perhaps a more meaningful expression of the reason for
nonilability is that the duty of the defendant can be satisfied not only by making the
procedure reasonably safe, but also by fully disclosing the then existing risks in the
procedure. Thus, in this sense, it may be said that the defendant is not liable for the
injury because it fulfilled its duty of making full disclosure and has, therefore, not been
negligent. See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 21.2 (1956). The problems of making full
advance disclosure of tonometry's dangers are discussed in the text following note 62 infra.
32 See L. Hand, J., in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
and in Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940). See also 2 Harper & James, supra
note 31.
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Taking tonometry as the specific example, how would this balancing
procedure operate? 38  Recent medical reports indicate that significant
physical injuries are suffered by about two people in every 10,000
screened. 4 Almost all of these injuries are probably inherent in the
procedure and are not the result of negligence at some later specific step
of the execution. 35 What other harm may be caused by tonometry
screening? One may be that the two to four false positives found in
every 100 screenees8 6 are hurt by having to pay some physician for a
complete diagnosis when they did not in fact have glaucoma. They may
also be hurt by anxiety incurred by the initial warning that they might
be positives. As will be seen later, most of these false positives probably
result from the choice of tonometry as the method of screening and
are not attributable to specific negligence at a later stage. 7 The false
negatives, perhaps one in 100 screenees, may also be said to be hurt by
screening if they are lulled into a false sense of security about their
conditions and delay to their detriment in seeking treatment.
33 Empiric knowledge of the tonometry procedure provides several quantitative yard-
sticks though, of course, the final balancing is not a matter of mathematics. See, e.g., L.
Hand, J., in Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1949).
34 This figure is derived from the following reports of anesthetic reactions from
tonometry: Screening for Glaucoma (U.S. Pub. Health Serv., Pamphlet No. 666, 1959)
reports seven mass glaucoma screenings involving 52,094 screenees. Correspondence has
revealed that no more than ten of these people suffered any anesthetic reactions. Another
report of a survey of 4,000 screenees reveals no anesthetic reactions. Ryan, "Glaucoma
-A New Challenge to Occupational Medicine," 1 Archives of Environmental Health
278, 280-84 (1960). Ryan also reports that he had correspondence with leading tonometry
experts who reported having done some 175,000-200,000 tonometries with a total of
14 allergic reactions. These totals suggest 24 anesthetic reactions in some 230,000-255,000
tests-a rate of about 1 in 10,000.
The incidence of corneal abrasions was determined as follows: Ryan reported no injuries
in his survey of 4,000 screenees. His correspondents who had done the 175,000-200,000
tonometries were said to have reported 16 corneal injuries. Ryan, supra at 278. A
German source reports ten "erosions" in a survey of 10,000 subjects. Leydhecker,
"The Technique and Organization of Mass Screening for Glaucoma," 51 Am. J. Ophthal-
mology 248, 251 (1961). All these figures combine to suggest corneal injury in about 13
cases in 100,000. Combining the anesthetic and the corneal injury figures yields a figure
of 23 in 100,000 or 2.3 in 10,000. Correspondence with the major medical malpractice
insurers has revealed only one claim for injury alleged to have been caused by tonometry.
All of the reported injuries have been minor. See note 39 infra.
35 The fact that tonometry may cause a certain number of injuries not attributable
to negligence, and that the procedure is ultimately determined to be a permissible one,
does not mean that there will be no liability for negligence at individual steps in the
procedure. These possibilities of specific negligence at some points in the procedure are
discussed in detail throughout. See 2 Harper & James, supra note 31.
36 The latest rate of false positives appears to be about two to each true positive,
according to recent experience with New York City screening programs. False positives
are explained in detail in the text at note 76 infra.
37 See note 35 supra.
38 It is estimated that tonometry detects more than half of the screenees who have
chronic glaucoma. Thus, for every true positive there is less than one false negative. This
is an outside margin of error since tonometry may detect two of every three chronic
cases or more depending on the referral standards chosen. See text following note 50,
infra, and Becker, "Annual Review, Glaucoma 1956-1957," 58 Archives of Ophthalmology
862, 896 (1957).
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So much for the likelihood of harm. How serious are the injuries
likely to be, should they occur? All the reports of physical injuries
caused by tonometry suggest that the injuries that do occur are extremely
minor, and not one permanent injury of any severity is known9 The
injury caused to the false positives seems trivial except for the possibility
of psychic injury due to anxiety. But even this may not be especially
serious since the error will probably be discovered as soon as the person
sees an ophthalmologist. 0 The extent of injury to false negatives would
be reduced by the warning that they should not rely on the test result
for more than two years since the disease may strike at any time.
Few persons should suffer more than two years' delay as false negatives
-and this is not necesarily a long period in the course of chronic simple
glaucoma, which takes ten years to manifest itself.4
Against these dangers, what benefits does tonometry offer? First,
and foremost, it does detect two true positives in every 100 persons
over the age of forty who are screened.4 This is a high yield and
demonstrates the potential value of the program on a long range basis.
Lastly, tonometry is presently the only feasible method of mass glaucoma
detection. It may well lead to the saving of millions from permanent and
total blindness.4 3 Moreover, any screening program alerts the public to
the dangers of a particular disease and also shows how easy it is to avoid
its dread consequences. It may well be argued that even the false
negatives and false positives have realized a benefit from the screening
by virtue of learning of the nature of the disease and of the necessity of
the two year retest; they might have known nothing of the disease
before the screening program.
Balancing these various factors, it seems that tonometry is a legally
permissible procedure; its benefits appear to outweigh its dangers.44
39 See Ryan, "Glaucoma-A New Challenge to Occupational Medicine," 1 Archives
of Environmental Health 278, 284 (1960). Correspondence with the major medical mal-
practice insurers disclosed one claim of a minor nature based on physical injury suffered
from tonometry. Correspondence also disclosed that the anesthetic reactions reported in
the screening of 52,094 persons in note 34 supra, were all minor.
40 See the full discussion of the problem of false positives in text following note 84 infra.
41 See note 20 supra and the full discussion of the problem of false negatives in the
text at note 78 infra.
42 The figure is derived from recent New York City screening experience and has
varied between one and two-running closer to two. There is probably some self-selection
in any screening program offered to the public. In the case of glaucoma, this is thought
to offset the false negatives and leads to the conclusion that some 2% of the population
over age 40 has chronic simple glaucoma.
43 It is estimated that in the United States, there are more than 1,000,000 victims
of chronic glaucoma, and that glaucoma causes more than 15% of all blindness. David,
"Symposium, Community Projects for the Early Detection of Glaucoma," 30 Sight Saving
Rev. 4 (1960).
44 This is the final judgment that must be made by a court in the light of what a
reasonable man in the position of the screening group would have thought at the time
1962]
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A group undertaking a given procedure that may be justified in itself
need not undertake to provide the most elaborate system that money
can buy. The only requirement is that what is actually undertaken be
reasonably safe when its dangers are compared to its benefits. Under
this analysis the tonometry screening program would appear to be a
reasonably safe undertaking and is the only way to achieve the desired
objective of mass screening.
Assuming that tonometry is a permissible screening method, what
type of tonometry should be used? Of the two major types in current
private use, applanation tonometry is much more accurate in measuring
the intraocular tension than the impression method described earlier,
of which the Schiotz tonometer is by far the most common and rep-
resentative.45 But, when the consideration is feasibility in a mass
screening program, applanation tonometry has little to offer. It requires
much more expensive equipment; 46 each test takes longer to perform
than with the Schiotz tonometer; 47 and it requires more expertly trained
personnel. Indeed, it apears that a large scale screening program would
not be feasible if the more accurate applanation tonometry were the
required method.
It is therefore difficult to imagine that any court would find it negli-
gent to screen with Schiotz tonometers instead of applanation tonometers
-especially since Schiotz tonometers are far more common even in
private offices than are applanation tonometers. A supporting analogy
is found in the important Battistella case.48 There, an employer gave
prospective employees a pre-hiring physical examination that included a
the program was undertaken. 2 Harper & James, Torts § 16.9, at 929 (1956). That
the particular balancing conclusion is "merely a fiat" and not susceptible to articulation
of reasons, see L. Hand J., in Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 61 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir.
1932). Facts may change and alter the present balance as to the future. See text at note
55, infra.
45 Applanation is considered accurate to within one millimeter of mercury. Since
normal blood pressure will cause fluctuations in eye tension of about one millimeter,
this is the limit of clinical accuracy. On the other hand, Schiotz tonometry is accurate to
within two or three millimeters of mercury for 95.5% of the population and is less
accurate for the remaining 4.5%. Sugar, The Glaucomas 84-85 (2d ed. 1957); Levene,
Interpretation of Tonometry Readings 3 (mimeo 1961--on file at the National Society
for the Prevention of Blindness). The difference in accuracy between these two measure-
ments is significant because normality and abnormality are so close numerically. One
authority states that a reading of 24 millimeters is suspicious, while 25 is usually
pathologic. Presumably, 22 or 23 would be normal. See Sugar, supra, at 177.
41 The applanation instrument itself costs about $300. But it must be used with a
slit lamp that costs about $1500. The slit lamp is useful for many other procedures in
a private practitioner's office but would have no other uses in a screening program.
Schiotz instruments cost about $60 each and require no other equipment.
47 It takes at least five minutes for applanation tonometry against less than two minutes
for Schiotz tonometry. See statement of Dr. Kaplan in "Symposium, Community Projects
for the Early Detection of Glaucoma," 30 Sight Saving Rev. 4, 20 (1960).




chest x-ray. The 3-y2" X 4-2" picture was the standard size used in
mass chest surveys. The two readers of the film did not spot a tuber-
cular indication, and the plaintiff was put to work on a job that aggra-
vated his condition. He sued his employer for negligence in failing to tell
him that he had tuberculosis and in assigning him to the aggravating
job. It was admitted that the spot might well have been detected had a
larger picture been made, such as the common 14" X 17" private office
size. Economic considerations apparently rule out use of the large size
for mass testing. Although the court did not discuss the use of small-sized
x-ray pictures, the opinion shows an awareness of the practical problems
of mass screening and indicates that the court would not require the same
protections for the plaintiff that it would require for a private patient in
the traditional physician-patient relationship.49 Yet, it is very likely that
a private physician who relief for diagnosis on his reading of one small-
sized x-ray picture would be deemed negligent for not using larger-sized
film or not taking more pictures from different angles.60 It is even clearer
that Schiotz tonometry, which is apparently the private patient standard,
would be proper in mass screening.
Another problem of some forms of screening is the establishment of
the quantitative standard for determining which screenees should be
referred to ophthalmologists for further study. In tuberculosis x-rays
a quantitative standard is not used because referrals are determined by
visual inspection of individual x-rays-usually by two readers.51 If
anything looks suspicious, no matter how small, referral is made. But
with tonometry, numbers tell the story. The danger level has been
determined empirically and is subject to change as new data alter
earlier ideas of presumptive normality.52  If the referral figure is set
49 This position is not based on the fact that the screening in the case was given by
an employer for his own benefit. See note 4 supra. The court suggests that even in a
public screening that is conducted for the benefit of the persons being examined, "it is
doubtful that the same grade of skilled technician would be required as in the case of
the private consultation at patient's request." Battistella v. Society of the N.Y. 1{osp.,
supra note 48, at 78, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
50 There is a strong admonition against reliance on small-sized pictures in Diagnostic
Standards 32 (Nat'l Tuberculosis Ass'n 1950).
51 See Diagnostic Standards 28 (Nat'l Tuberculosis Ass'n 1950), in which it is suggested
that tuberculosis screening programs use two readers for each x-ray or that the same reader
look at each picture twice with an interval of time between. Another source suggests there
is as much as 30% variation among different readers interpreting the same film, and
also recommends two readers. Shultz, "Screening Methods for Pulmonary Tuberculosis," in
Hilleboe & Larimore, Preventive Medicine 521, 528 (1959).
52 In 1957, Sugar suggested 24 millimeters as suspicious. See note 45, supra. A recent
study suggests 21 millimeters as the upper limit of normality. Levene, Interpretation of
Tonometry Readings 6 (mimeo 1961-on file at the National Society for the Prevention of
Blindness).
Relative referral standards are utilized along with the absolute standards. Thus, if
the screenee's tensions in the two eyes are more than four millimeters apart, he should
be referred no matter how low both readings are in absolute terms. See Sugar, The
Glaucomas 177 (2d ed. 1957).
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too high, the result will be more false negatives; if set too low the result
will be more false positives. Although referral standards are a serious
practical problem, they cannot be discussed meaningfully without
an extended statistical presentation that would be inappropriate in this
general survey of problems.
EXECUTION OF SCREENING PROCEDURE
The second source of problems is the actual execution of the proce-
dure. In the original choice of the procedure safety and effectiveness were
major considerations. If chest x-rays were unreasonably dangerous
because of excessive radiation, there might be negligence in the choice
of that screening method. Similarly, if the safest anesthetic used in
tonometry injured an inordinately large number of people, this might
make the choice of tonometry negligent when viewed against the benefits
it offered. However, even a decision that the method chosen is rea-
sonably safe does not preclude liability in its application. Every
procedure, no matter how safe, has its possible danger spots. The blood
sampling in diabetes testing may lead to infection; the tonometer
may scratch the eye. But these possibilities of physical injury present
few questions that are unique to screening and not present in the
physician-patient relationship as it is traditionally conceived.53
A problem that is unique to screening is the increased possibility of
starting an epidemic in the community. When the tonometer touches
the eye of a screenee it may pick up a virus or other. germ and pass
it on to future screenees unless precautions are taken. This raises the
question of whether the tonometers must be sterilized before each use
or whether cleansing is suffcient. Cleansing will remove some' foreign
matter but will not kill viruses or other highly resistant micro-organisms.
Sterilization is obviously the most desirable possible procedure,
but it has its drawbacks. First, it takes a long time, which means that
each screening program will need many additional tonometers. Secondly,
the sterilization process generally involves intense heat, and there is the
danger that i hot tonometer may be put on an eye, causing greater
injury than would the virus that might be conveyed. Further, in the
time required to cool the heated tonometer sufficiently to be placed on
the eye, some new foreign bodies may infect the instrument. Sterilization
53 The physical injuries that may be suffered at the test by screenees are essentially
the same as those that might be suffered by patients in a private physician's office; anes-
thetic reaction and corneal abrasion. However, the fact that a person of lower skill may per-
form the actual tests at a screening program may increase the likelihood of injury and raise
new liability questions. See text following note 67 infra.
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methods other than heat are quite expensive in terms of equipment
and take even longer to operate.
But doing nothing more than cleansing is not so serious as it might
appear. First, the eye has its own defense mechanisms, including tears,
that fight infection. Second, if contagious eye disease is present in the
community no testing is done. Third, even though there is the theoretical
risk of spreading a virus disease through tonometry, the experience of
recent mass screening programs suggests that the risk is greatly over-
rated.54
It may well be that balancing the likelihood of harm and the severity
of harm, if it occurs (discomfort but no permanent damage likely),
against the utility of relying on cleansing, a court might find no negligence
in the failure to sterilize-at least until the first reported epidemic.
After the first epidemic, if one should occur, the balance may very well
shift since the frequency of injury and, perhaps, potential severity may
then appear higher than at present.55
The fact that the anesthetic takes fifteen to twenty minutes to lose
its effect raises another problem of execution that is more serious in a
screening context than in a private patient relationship. The danger here
is that after the screenee leaves the screening center a foreign body may
enter his eye and cause some damage without his being aware of it. In a
private consultation the ophthalmologist can usually adjust for this by
doing other procedures after using the anesthetic so that it will have time
to wear off while the patient is still in the office. In a screening program
that combines tests for several diseases at the same time, the glaucoma
test could be done first so that the screenees would be inside the
building until the anesthetic wore off. In the case of a screening program
limited to tonometry, however, the problem of what to do with the
screenees before the anesthetic wears off is a serious one. Presumably,
the screening group would fulfill its obligation of due care and be acting
in the most practical manner by warning screenees of the risk of foreign
bodies entering their eyes and then by providing a place for them to wait
for the anesthetic to wear off if they so desire.
At this point we might consider some recent cases that have found
liability against physicians for mishaps that were not shown to be
54 Seven mass screening programs involving over 52,000 people did not cause any,
epidemics although no tonometers were sterilized. See Screening for Glaucoma (U.S.
Pub. Health Serv., Publication No. 666, 1959). Similarly, Ryan did tonometry on 4,100
factory workers without sterilization and did not report any trouble. Ryan, "Glaucoma-
A New Challenge to Occupational Medicine," 1 Archives of Environmental Health, 273,
281 (1960). No such epidemic is known to have occurred anywhere.




due in any way to the physician's negligence in choosing or applying
the procedureY6 Liability was based on the fact that the physician had
not enabled the patient to make a decision about proposed treatment
with full knowledge of the procedure's inherent risks as well as its
benefits. There was a significant possibility in each case that had such
warnings been given, the patient would not have consented to the
treatment and would not have suffered the alleged injury."
1 This does
not mean that that every conceivable risk must be disclosed in advance
of every medical procedure. The proper approach is suggested by one
court as follows:
[Tihe, physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and
this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose
between two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient
every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter
how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is already
unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery
in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually in-
creasing the risks by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension
itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate prob-
lem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in
certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a
certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full
disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.
58
This advice may provide meaningful guidance to private physicians
because of its stress on the individual nature of the problem. But this
individual consideration is impossible in screening; either all patients
will be told something or none will. 59
A review of the cases requiring disclosure provides a basis for
determining whether such notice is necessary in a mass screening pro-
gram. In each case either the risk of injury was high or the possible
injury would be serious, or both. In one case involving electroshock
and insulin treatments, evidence disclosed a nineteen to twenty-five per-
56 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, on rehearing, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960). But
cf. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955). For discussion of these cases,
see also note, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1960).
57 This is the element of actual causation which .is necesary for every tort action.
2 Harper & James, Torts § 20.2 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 44 (2d ed. 1955). Were the
plaintiff to recover even though he admitted he would have submitted to the procedure
in any event, it could not be said that the failure to inform played any part in the infliction
of the injury.
58 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, supra note 56, at 560, 317 P.2d at
181.
59 This, of course, applies only to the general literature and directions. During the actual
testing, the tester may say different things to different people and will attempt to approxi-
mate as closely as possible a private office atmosphere.
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cent risk that the patient would suffer broken bones.60 In another,
there was a serious risk of burns from radiation treatments that were
advised after cancer surgery."' In both cases it was not unlikely that
with a complete understanding of the prospective benefits of the pro-
cedure and its risks, the patient would have preferred the status quo.
Moreover, neither knowledge of the risks nor any consequent fear
would have reduced the likelihood of successful treatment in either case,
so that there was no medical justification for withholding the infor-
mation.
6 2
Against this background there seems good reason not to require full
disclosure of all possible risks to every patient in a screening. First, the
risks of no current screening program come close to those of the cases
considered above in either frequency of injury or potential severity.
Second, there is no opportunity to talk with each screenee about the
risks and benefits of the procedure. A large sign or printed literature
would be the only ways of conveying such information to prospective
screenees. The personal reassurance possible during a private con-
versation with a physician would not be available. Any mass com-
munication might cause many persons to be wary and to refuse to be
tested, even though any objective appraisal of the risk compared with
the benefit in any of these screening programs suggests that refusal
to take the test because of fear of injury is illusory.
Even a sign in a glaucoma screening center saying that two in 10,000
suffer minor, temporary injuries, but that one or two people in every
100 tested are found to have glaucoma, might not be advisable. In the
electroshock and radiation cases fear of injury would not have decreased
the likelihood of successful treatment. However with tonometry, relaxa-
tion of the patient is essential to accurate measurement. If the screenee
is tense for any reason, the readings will be artificially high and he may
become a false positive.6 3 An excess of false positives caused by fear
of physical injury would destroy public confidence in the entire screening
program.
4
Even if no duty exists to warn of the risks involved, there might still
60 Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
61 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, on rehearing, 187 Kan. 86, 364
P.2d 670 (1960).
62 See quotation in text accompanying note 58 supra.
63 This may also occur if the patient is not in a completely relaxed position during
the testing. Failure to open a collar button and loosen a tie may account for a few
millimeters difference.
64 See Packer, "Symposium, Community Projects for the Early Detection of Glaucoma,"
30 Sight Saving Rev. 4, 8-9 (1960), stating that some screenees become angry and




be a duty to advise prospective screenees about what is going to happen
to them. For example, in tonometry anesthetic is used at the outset.
It has been determined that the incidence of allergic reaction to the
anesthetic is probably about one in 10,000.5 This is so minimal that
there may be no duty to warn expressly of the risk of reaction, but there
may still be a duty to advise screenees that first they will receive some
anesthetic in each eye. In this way, a person who knows of a previous
bad experience with eye anesthetic will have an opportunity-and a
duty6 6-to ask questions and take steps to protect himself. Keeping
the screenees generally informed about what is going to happen to them
may also help to reduce tensions and injuries often caused by ignorance
of what is being done. 7
Once any duty to warn has been satisfied, the actual execution of the
procedure presents the problem of who should do the testing itself.
In private practice, for example, tonometry is apparently done almost
exclusively by ophthalmologists, and only occasionally by general
practitioners or by nurses or technicians in private offices. Should this
control the staffing of a screening program? Would technicians be
practicing medicine illegally if they were trained to do tonometry
testing?"8  This is obviously an important practical question. The
expansion of the screening program would be much easier if personnel
other than physicians could be used, provided that they could perform
as well as physicians.6 9 Concepts of what nurses and technicians may
do under the practice statutes are constantly changing, and these
65 See note 34 supra for the derivation of this figure.
'D See Stokes v. Dailey, 85 N.W.2d 745 (N. Dak. 1957), second appeal, 97 N.W.2d
676 (1959), in which a patient who knew of previous reactions to a prescription did
not tell the physian and was given and used the same prescription again. The court
held that the jury could find contributory negligence in the patient's silence and subsequent
use of the prescription a second time.
67 The patient must be warned not to move his eye while the tonometer is on it--or
else he will suffer injury. He must be comfortable and stare straight up-or the reading
will be inaccurate. These directions could easily be given with a not-too-clinical expla-
nation of what is happening and would impose some reciprocal obligation on the screenee.
See note 66, supra.
68 Statutes defining the practice of medicine, the practice of nursing, and penalties for
illegal practice pose the non-tort problem here. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 6501,
6513(2) (a), 6901, 6909, 6910(1)(c).
69 One report of a glaucoma screening program discloses that plant staff nurses performed
over 99.9% of the tonometries done in a survey of 4,100 persons. No injuries were
reported. Ryan, "Glaucoma-A New Challenge to Occupational Medicine," 1 Archives of
Environmental Health 278, 284 (1960). This suggests that non-medical personnel can be
trained to do this specific task. This should not be too surprising because the test is a
rather mechanical one with virtually no discretion or judgment involved except as to
whether the tests should be done at all on persons who manifest contraindications. On
the other hand, one author flatly states that eyes "have been lost by technicians anesthe-
tizing them and using a tonometer. .... " and concludes that technicians should never give
these tests. Kuhn, "Glaucoma Detection in Industry," 26 Indus. Med. & Surgery 327 (1957).
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questions will cause difficulty when the time for decision arrives. 70
However, in the Battistellad1 case a dictum touches on this problem:
Moreover, even where examinations are conducted in such activities as
mass tubercular surveys, for the benefit of the person examined, it is
doubtful that the same grade of skilled technician would be required as
in the case of the private consultation at patient's request.72
Although the dictum does not mention the practice-of-medicine statutes,
the language indicates that the personnel standards for screening pro-
grams may not be so high as those for private physician-patient relation-
ships.
From a tort standpoint, this problem is confused by the concept of
actual causation; if the physician himself had done this examination or
supervised it, is there any reason to think that the same injury would
not have occurred? If the injury is anesthetic reaction, the answer is
probably negative, and there should be no liability even though a statute
has been violated . 3  However, if the injury is caused by dragging the
tonometer across the eye, the operator would be charged with negligence
attributable under respondeat superior to the screening group, which
delegated the function to the operator.74 Of course, if the operator
70 The question of whether nurses may give intravenous -injections in New York pro-
vides a good example of changing attitudes. In 1942, the Attorney General ruled that
these injections did not come within the practice of nursing statute so that nurses would
be practicing medicine illegally when giving them-except in certain emergency situations.
1942 N.Y. Att'y Gen. 368. In 1961, after considering the question for more than one year,
the Attorney General concluded that the medical profession now considers nurses competent
to give such injections, and that they may properly do so whenever ordered by a physician.
1961 N.Y. Att'y Gen. - (February 28, 1961).
71 Battistella v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 9 App. Div. 2d 75, 191 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st
Dep't 1959).
72 Id. at 78, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 629-30.
73 The doctrine of negligence per se will not operate to create liability because some
causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury is required. See Prosser,
Torts § 34, at 157-58 (2d ed. 1955).
74 Although physicians are usually thought to be independent contractors, there are
situations in which they may be servants. The tonometry that will be done at public
screenings would seem to be a perfunctory test which the physician performs more as a
highly trained technician than as a physician exercising discretion and judgment. See
Mrachek v. Sunshine Baking Co., 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954). This suggests
that, under general rules of respondeat superior, the screening group might be liable for
the negligence of physicians acting as examiners.
But even if the tonometry testing is considered a medical function, the screening group
might still be liable if the screenees are not given any indication that the physicians are
independent practitioners. The screenees obviously have no duty to inquire into the precise
status of the physicians and may reasonably assume that they are employed by the sponsor-
ing group. See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 832, 291 P.2d 915, 927 (1955). Furthermore,
since a major purpose of the screening group is the dissemination of information about
the disease, it can be argued that the volunteer physicians are directly benefitting the
sponsoring group in giving the tests. See Ferson, Principles of Agency § 117 (1954).
The screening group may also be liable for the negligence of nurses that the physicians
bring with them-as, of course, will the physician. The screening group may be liable
under the doctrine of apparent authority because it will appear to the public that the
nurse is working for the Foundation and they may rely on this impression. See Ferson,
supra, § 54.
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was not competent to do tonometry, then the original delegation might
be primary negligence for which the delegator will be liable.75
NOTIFICATION OF TEST RESULTS
The third category concerns problems arising from notifying screenees
of the test results. In diagnosis the goal is to tell the patient what is
wrong with him, and the physician is required to adhere to standard
practice in arriving at his conclusions. In screening, however, the result
is not intended to be in the least definitive. Indeed, the very nature of
screening creates two major problems; the so-called false negatives and
the false positives. The results of any screening program will yield
initially two, but ultimately four groups. The largest of the four is the
true negative group-those who are told accurately that they have
shown none of the danger signs being sought and do not have the disease
in question. The second group is the true positive-those whose test
results warrant further study and who are ultimately determined to have
the disease being sought. The third and fourth groups are the false
counterparts to the first two; the false negatives are incorrectly classified
as not having the disease, and the false positives are notified that their
conditions warrant further study though they do not have the disease.
76
Neither the true negatives nor the true postives offer any medical
or legal problem-except that the true negatives must realize the finite
75 See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 26.1, at 1362-63 (1956).
76 The breakdown of major screening programs into these four groups might be along
the following general lines:















The diabetes figures are reported in Reynolds, "Screening Methods for Diabetes MeUitu.%"
in Hilleboe & Larimore, Preventive Medicine 541, 544 (1959). (Although these figures
indicate the blood sampling method is more efficient, this must be balanced against the
greater likelihood of injury in the blood sampling method from extraction mishaps). The
glaucoma estimates are the result of experience discussed and reported throughout this
article. See notes 36, 38 supra. Tuberculosis figures are difficult to isolate because of
the many other chest conditions detected at the same time. However, in New York, chest
x-rays of the general population now yield 1.1 true positive cases of tuberculosis for every
1,000 screenees. Shultz, "Screening Methods for Pulmonary Tuberculosis," in Hilleboe
& Larimore, Preventive Medicine 521, 530 (1959).
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nature of this assurance. They should be cautioned that periodic tests
are necessary for continued security.7 The problems are caused by the
false categories.
What causes a negative to be a false negative? In glaucoma screening,
there may be several explanations for false negatives. First, the tensions
might not have been elevated because the screenee had low-tension
glaucoma. Second, the usually high tension might have been low at
testing time because of reduced liquid in the body, diurnal fluctuations,
scleral rigidity variation, or a spontaneous remission that reduced
the tension. The test may have been given carelessly so that the true
figures were not achieved or recorded; or, lastly, clerical carelessness
may have caused the screenee to receive the wrong notice. The extensive
scope of the possibilities demonstrates that only some instances of
failure to detect glaucoma are caused by negligence.
From the medical standpoint, false negatives are a problem no matter
how caused.78 The legal problem is to determine whether a given
false negative was caused by negligence of the screening group. The
problem of low-tension glaucomas was discussed earlier in considering
whether tonometry alone was a permissible choice of screening method.79
With no negligence in the choice of the procedure there should be no
liability to these false negatives. Similarly, if the cause of falsity was some-
thing internal such as the amount of liquid in the body, diurnal fluctu-
ations, a low rigidity, or spontaneous remissions, there would appear to
be no negligence. These factors cannot reasonably be considered in a
screening program."0 On the other hand, if the test is done negligently,
if the results are carelessly noted, or if the wrong notification is dis-
patched to the screenee, these all bespeak negligence.
But how can the plaintiff prove that the falsity of the notification
was caused by some act of negligence rather than by some condition
beyond the control of the screening group? This is a most difficult proof
problem. The possible internal conditions of the plaintiff, including low-
tension glaucomas, will be very hard to prove or disprove until much
77 See fuller discussion of this aspect of notificatlbn in the text at note 88 infra.
78 The nature of the screening program will dictate to a large extent how widespread
the false negative problem will be. Where the test is visual, as with tuberculosis x-rays,
and where any questionable case will be referred, the false negative problem should be
much less serious than with glaucoma screening where the test is quantitative and only
seeks a symptom that is common to most, but not all, chronic glaucoma. Yet, in Battistella
v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 9 App. Div. 2d 75, 78, 191 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1st Dep't
1959) an expert testified for the defendant that the experience of qualified radiologists
disclosed "an error of approximately 27% on survey readings where the finding is negative."
79 See note 26 supra.
80 If this were the diagnosis, however, it might be negligent for a physician not to
take steps to determine whether these factors would explain low readings. Reliance on
one reading would be questionable practice. See notes 50, 51 supra.
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more is known about the disease. Even if a plaintiff can prove that he
had standard scleral rigidity at test time, that his body held a normal
amount of liquid, that the test was not administered near the bottom
of his diurnal fluctuation, he still must show that there was no spontaneous
remission and that in fact his tension was above the danger line at the
time of the test. Each of these items will be very difficult, if not im-
possible, to prove."'
But assuming that such proof can be made, or that it can be shown
that someone simply mailed the wrong form to the screenee, what
liability will exist to false negatives for this negligence? The claim
apparently would be that the defendant screening group negligently
misrepresented the plaintiff's condition to him and that he was injured
by relying on the notice and taking no action. 2 The validity and sweep
of this claim will depend upon the type of notice sent to those thought
to be negatives. Presumably the screening group will phrase the notice
so as to warn that in two years another test should be taken because
the disease may strike at any time. If this is the gist of the notice it
seems unlikely that a plaintiff would reasonably be able to rely on
his negative notification for more than two years,8 3 so that even if in
a given case there is liability to a false negative, it should not be for
more than the damages, if any, attributable to a two-year delay
in seeking treatment.8 4
Let us turn now to the problem of the false positive. In glaucoma
his false status might be caused by the converses of many of the factors
that caused false negatives: a significantly high tension for most people
81 The very listing of possible causes of injury indicates that, without more, this is
not a proper case for the application of traditional res ipsa loquitur since it is impossible
to say that the error was more likely than not caused by negligence. Prosser, Torts § 42
(2d ed. 1955). If the doctrine is invoked in order to force the screening group to come
forward to explain the reason for the error, it might be applied to this situation. Cf.
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
Of course, the plaintiff has an easy case if he can pinpoint a negligent cause of the error.
In Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956), plaintiff
proved that his medical card in defendant's office contained several notations indicating
that his chest x-rays appeared to disclose tuberculosis. He convinced the jury that he had
never been so informed and the defendant was held liable for negligent failure to inform
him of a discovered defect.
82 The negligent misrepresentation action requires reasonable reliance by the plaintiff
to his detriment. See 1 Harper & James, Torts § 7.13 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 89 (2d
ed. 1955).
83 Brown v. Dark, 196 Ark. 724, 119 S.W.2d 529 (1938); Jenkins v. Charlestown Gen.
Hosp., 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922).
84 In Jenkins v. Charlestown Gen. Hosp., supra note 83, the defendant hospital's servant
negligently told the plaintiff that x-rays showed that his arm was healing properly. Two
weeks later, plaintiff saw a physician who told him that his arm was becoming crooked.
The court held the hospital liable for the injury caused by the two-week delay, but said




that does not affect this particular individual; " high scleral rigidity, a
high amount of liquid in the body, tension caused by fear or even by
failure to loosen the screenee's collar; improper testing procedure; or
carelessness in notification. Again, some of these are attributable to
negligence while others are not, and the proof problems will be extremely
difficult.
If, however, negligence can be shown, what sort of liability might
follow? Here the claim appears to be two-fold: First, plaintiff expended
money to undergo a full scale diagnosis only to find out that there was
nothing wrong with him; and, second, he suffered physical injury from
the anxiety caused by the letter of notification. The first claim may vary
from $10 to $300.80 It may even be argued in defense that the expendi-
ture enabled the screenee to have more conclusive peace of mind than
would an original negative notification. The real problem is posed by
the possible claim of anxiety, especially in the light of the recent New
York case of Ferrara v. Galluchio. In that case the defendant physician
negligently treated plaintiff's shoulder wound. It failed to heal properly
and plaintiff eventually went to a dermatologist who told her not to
neglect the wound lest it become cancerous. Plaintiff sought damages
from the defedant for both the negligent treatment of the shoulder
and also for cancerophobia, which she claimed she had developed after
the second physician's warning. There was no claim that plaintiff had or
would get cancer, only that she suffered from cancerophobia with pos-
sibly permanent anxiety symptoms. The Court of Appeals upheld a
jury award of $10,000 for the original negligence in treatment plus
$15,000 for the cancerophobia.
The implications for screening programs are obvious. If the screenee
is negligently told his results are positive and he develops severe
anxiety symptoms before the error is discovered, an analogy to Ferrara
would not be too far-fetched. Of course, there are important differences
between the situations. Despite the severe consequences probably
neither tuberculosis nor glaucoma is today nearly so dread as cancer
in the public mind. Also, only the passage of time could prove or dis-
prove the correctness of the cancer warning in Ferrara, while in a
screening program any erroneous positive notification will probably be
rectified when the screenee goes to a physician for complete diagnosis.
This should reduce considerably the duration of possible anxiety.
85 This medical situation is the converse of the low tension glaucoma-and again shows
the problems arising from reliance on statistical standards for setting referral figures.
86 See note 64, supra. Apparently, these claims are not pursued past the angry letter
stage. The best course in this situation is prevention of such anger by better explanation
of the screening goals and limits. See text at note 89, infra.
87 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
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The importance of the actual wording of notifications to negatives has
already been noted, and the phrasing of the notice to the positives is
equally important. Both notifications must tread narrow lines. Letters88
to negatives should stress the positive aspects of screening-the idea that
screening is mainly geared to finding people who have a particular symptom
of a particular disease and not in negating the disease in others. The
necessity for periodic tests should be emphasized so that no screenee can
possibly be misled as to what was done to him and what value it has for
the future. Notification to the positives should be sufficiently alarming
to get them to see a physician for full diagnosis, but should not frighten
the recipients unduly."9 This letter might even quote the statistic that
two of every three people receiving it do not have glaucoma, 0 but that
the recipient should see his physician just to make sure. Such a letter
should serve to allay fears and to prevent or minimize any reaction such
as that proven in Ferrara.
Apart from its legal implications, accurate and complete information
about the nature of screening enables the public to understand the aims
of the procedure,how it works, and what its results mean. Such publi-
city-both before and after the actual testing-will help immeasurably
in educating the public9 to the medical aspects of mass screening pro-
grams. It should also help to avoid misunderstandings of the sort
now only too common in much current medical-legal controversy.
88 It should be obvious that all notifications should be in writing. In Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, supra note 81, servants of the defendant claimed to have
notified plaintiff orally of the tubercular condition that defendant had discovered. Plaintiff
denied some conversations entirely and claimed the content of others did not inform hn
of his condition. The jury believed plaintiff, and defendant was held liable for negligent
failure to inform.
89 On the other hand, the screening group must be sure to impress on the screenee the
potential seriousness of the situation, especially if the disease is relatively unknown.
Glaucoma experience has indicated that even with such warnings there are significant num-
bers who will not, for one reason or another, go to a physician for diagnosis. See
report by Garner & Dressier, 31 Sight Saving Rev. 41 (1961) on experience in Milwaukee.
Of course, if the notice accurately conveys the dangers of failure to see a physician, the
screening group will not be liable for injuries suffered by a screenee who did nothing.
See Brown v. Dark, supra note 83.
90 See note 36 supra.
91 The need for such education is graphically shown by a recent study indicating that
40% of the women in the United States are unaware of the simple smear test for uterine
cancer. 1962 Cancer Facts and Figures 12 (1961).
